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Abstract:  This  paper  tries  to  shift  the  contrast  of  debates  between  'scholasticii'  and  'politici'  away  from
conceptualizing it in terms of theology vs. rationalism, since in a way both share a modern, rationalist outlook: It
is argued that the practice of politics is recognized by both Machiavelli and his scholastic counterpart Girolamo
Savonarola as deeply characterised by prudential and "realist" considerations. The main difference seems to be
the conceptualizing of one's own historical situation, of the eventual success of one's own practice and of societal
development  in  terms either  of  a  teleological  framework  or  of  radical  contingency.  Put  this  way,  the same
arguments  that  allow Machiavelli  to  move away from the  former  framework  then  cast  doubts  also  on  the
possibilities of a rational political theory, in the sense of transparent and certain knowledge and understanding.
The paper draws on Claude Lefort's interpretation of Machiavelli in order to highlight a radically immanentist
perspective in  the 'Principe'.  The Machiavellian approach involves a  distinct  methodological  perspective on
politics, on power, and on history that is contrasted with a rationalist paradigm that is prominent in political
theory, but has been sharply criticized already by Machiavelli himself.
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I. Introduction
Machiavelli’s arguably a-moral theory – the fact that he suggests a political leader to override moral
concerns  when it  is  necessary  for  the  security  of  either  the  commonwealth,  the  state  or  just  his
personal rule – is taken to be a first important step in the early modern realization of a proper logic of
politics. In this sense, it is poised against more traditional theories that would submit the behaviour of
a political leader to an ethics based on the Christian virtues like benevolence, liberality, justice, and
faith. In fact, the discussion of these virtues takes a central place in the  Principe, and for Quentin
Skinner, Machiavelli thereby quite consciously repudiates a very specific discourse, namely a neo-
Roman civic republicanism1. The point of Machiavelli’s manoeuvre seems to be the establishment of
an ethics of statecraft that is independent of individual morals. But besides humanist or republican
treatises on the virtuous prince in his quest for glory and excellence, another prominent genre in which
theories of political rule had been formulated, is the writings of scholastic authors. In these writings,
matters  of  individual  decisions  and  behaviour  would  be  integrated  with  larger,  more  systematic
theories of the nature and purpose of political rule, of law and justice in general, of the purpose of the
commonwealth, the origins of political authority etc. And they would be connected to reflections on
how the whole natural and supernatural universe as a whole had been created, what order, structure
and purpose can be seen in it. Thomas Aquinas’s De regno ad regem Cypri was certainly not the first
work  in  this  genre2,  but,  along  with  the  more  elaborate  Aristotelian  framework  in  his  Summa
Theologiae, and along with Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum, it helped define the genre. These
scholastic authors  shared a  common,  Aristotelian idea about  how politics  made sense only in the
1 This  is  supposed to  mean something quite  different  from what  J.G.A.  Pocock and others  have
described  as  civic  humanism,  a  theory  that,  according  to  Skinner,  Machiavelli  along  with  many
contemporaries had abandoned for good anyway. This debate has not been concluded; cf. e.g. J.G.A.
POCOCK,  The  Machiavellian  Moment,  Princeton,  Princeton  Univ.  Press,  1975;  Q.  SKINNER,  The
Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997, chap. 4–6., esp.
pp. 128–138; M. GEUNA, Skinner, pre-humanist rhetorical culture and Machiavelli, in: (edd.) A. Brett
et al.,  Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press,
2006, pp. 50–72.
2 This book was actually not completed by Thomas Aquinas himself, but by a pupil of his, Ptolemy of
Lucca. The combined work was known as De regimine principum and has been attributed for a long
time to Thomas alone.
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context of a relation of individual ethics to life in a community, even of an eschatological endeavour
and, more importantly for the present purpose, they shared an idea of how the science and knowledge
of politics was constituted and related to other branches of knowledge. Their teleological perspective
led these authors to find the essence of politics in its being a means of achieving a non-political goal,
peace and ultimately beatitude, the achievability of which was deposited with and in human nature3.
A striking contrast to these traditional approaches lies in the  Principe’s focus on the question «by
which means political rule can be achieved and conserved»4. But surely this question did not suddenly
fall out of the blue sky on Machiavelli’s desk and we should be more careful in investigating how it
paralleled and diverged from its  more immediate predecessors. While this has been done to some
extent  for the  relation between Machiavelli  and the civic humanists  and republicans,  which I  am
bypassing completely here5, I want to get started by discussing a few things that are remarkable in the
comparison between Machiavelli and Girolamo Savonarola.
II. Girolamo Savonarola
The fate of Girolamo Savonarola is one of Machiavelli’s favourite examples for the illustration of his
teachings. For Machiavelli, it is an example of very recent time – Savonarola had been burnt on the
stake  only  in  1498,  the  very  year  that  Machiavelli  took  the  office  of  second  chancellor  of  the
Florentine Republic – and it is an example where the relation of abstract ideas, ethical demands, and
political practice is evidently crucial.
Backed  with  warnings,  visions  and  apocalyptic  prophecies  about  an  imminent  divine  scourge,
Savonarola had urged the Florentine people to repent  and reform themselves just  as well  as their
republic and its institutions. Political events facilitated his rise, such as the expedition of Charles VIII
of  France  into  Italy,  who  in  1495 stood  at  the  gates  of  Florence  and was  understood to  be  the
fulfilment of Savonarola’s gloomy prophecies. When Piero de’ Medici fled from Florence, this left
Savonarola as the city’s leading public figure. In this role, he successfully inspired legal initiatives to
rid the city of all sorts of immoral behaviour, to reform the city’s constitution and to prevent a return to
(Medicean) tyranny6. While in many discussions of renaissance politics, Savonarola is represented as a
millenarian preacher with an over-demanding ethical programme and bigoted followers, we do well to
take note of his 1498 treatise Circa il reggimento e governo della città di Firenze7. This was clearly
inspired by Aquinas’s and Ptolemy’s  De regimine principum and sought, rather soberly, to develop
arguments of the older work in the specific Florentine context of his days. Suggesting more than just
an  application  of  abstract  principles  inherited  from scholastic  authorities  to  the  concrete  case  of
Florence, Savonarola sought to ground the force of his arguments in their historical plausibility. While
he begins rather classically with a derivation of political power from man’s God-given nature, with the
3 This orientation of man and of politics towards a transcendent goal is of course an idealization –
introduced here for the purpose of marking a desire of distinction on Machiavelli’s part – which was
adopted only to a certain extent by the respective authors. Among the more "immanentist" authors,
Marsilius of Padua seems to stand out, with a «secular» conception of political order and a focus on
efficient causality that takes a significant distance from an Aristotelian approach and is in interesting
ways  analogous  to  Machiavelli’s  arguments.  Cf.  V.  SYROS,  Die  Rezeption  der  aristotelischen
politischen Philosophie bei Marsilius von Padua, Leiden, Brill, 2007-2008; for explicit comparisons
between Marsilius and Machiavelli, see e.g.  B. BAYONA AZNAR,  Marsilio de Padua y Maquiavelo:
una lectura comparada, in: Foro Interno 7 (2007), pp. 11–34; J.C. GARCIA, Conflito, Democracia e o
Renascimento Italiano: Marsílio e Maquiavel, in: Revista da Seção Judiciária do Rio de Janeiro 19/35
(2012), pp. 205–212.
4 «[C]ome questi principati si possino governare e mantenere» (N. MACHIAVELLI,  Principe, cap.  II,
(ed.) Martelli, p.???).
5 For this aspect, cf. supra, note 1.
6 In fact, the "Savonarolan" republican constitution survived until 1512, when the Spanish restored the
Medicean rule (and drove Machiavelli out of office, too).
7 Cited according to its edition in  G. SAVONAROLA,  Trattato del reggimento degli Stati,  Milan, G.
Silvestri, 1848, reprinted in Aalen, Scientia, 1973. The translations into English are mine.
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classical distinction of different types of government and with the remark that, «absolutely speaking,
[... the government] of a king is best»8, in the particular case of Florence, a republican government is
best. And the reason for this is not a general issue like human corruptibility, which attaches the greater
risk to monarchical government, but rather historical experience: Savonarola insists that the «nature of
the people»9 must be considered. Then one supposedly finds that the Italian people can hardly support
monarchical  rule  because  of  their  ingenious  and  hot-blooded  nature,  which  is  confirmed  by  the
historical observation that no monarchical government could ever unite large parts of Italy for a long
time10. And these character traits are especially prominent in the Florentine people. But it is not only
the  observations  of  the  theoretician  that  find  a  mere  confirmation  in  historical  experience;  the
mentioned  nature  itself  is  constituted  historically,  «custom  is  a  second  nature» 11.  After  which
Savonarola spends quite some effort to explain how the ancient custom of Governo Civile in Florence
has been taken on and impregnated the minds of the citizenry so as to make the Governo Civile the
form of government that is «naturally» adequate to Florence. In the conclusion of this part of his
treatise, Savonarola gives yet another spin to the argument with a demonstration that the Florentine
Governo Civile and the efforts to maintain it are under God’s blessing and that its maintenance against
all odds can be explained only by His active intervention. In this way, the historical considerations are
crucial  elements  in  an argument  that  starts  traditionally  – with human nature  and the purpose of
political power – and ends in a political theology: in Florence, the Governo Civile is divinely ordained.
The  central  second  part  of  the  treatise  consists  of  an  extensive  (almost  30  pages)  exhortation
concerning the vices and the wicked behaviour of the tyrant and the bad consequences it has for the
city, and again especially for the city of Florence. If it weren’t for the subsequent publications of
Machiavelli, one would certainly find good reasons in this part to give credit to Savonarola as an
exceptionally sensitive and realistic observer – he describes in detail the schemes and stratagems that
rulers use (and had in fact used in Florence in recent times) in order to attain their goals. The tyrant
conceals how, when,  and by whom decisions are made,  so that  his subjects can never imagine to
understand politics; he cultivates disagreement among the citizenry in order to «divide and conquer»;
he deals rewards and restrictions,  so that  excellent  men cannot rise,  while those who do rise  are
mediocre  and depend on him;  he commands an army of  informers  and uses various strategies  to
insinuate them into the citizen’s private affairs, while openly interfering with and monopolizing the
city’s public affairs; he subtly subverts the laws and installs arbitrary rule; he honours sycophants,
extorts presents, etc. And every time he seems to promote his virtue or the public good, it is just a
sham meant only to enhance his public image12.
8 «[P]arlando assolutamente, il Governo […] de’Re è ottimo» (Ibid., tratt. I, cap. II, p. 13).
9 «[L]a natura del popolo» (Ibid., p. 16).
10 .«[C]ome si è visto sempre nell’Italia, la quale sappiamo per la esperienza dei tempi passati insino
al  presente,  che non ha mai  potuto durare  sotto  il  reggimento di  un Principe.  Anzi  vediamo che
essendo piccola provincia, è divisa quasi in tanti Principi quanto sono le città, le quali non stanno
quasi mai in pace» (Ibid., tratt. I, cap. III, p. 18), [my emphasis]. Cf. also p. 21: «E questo molto
meglio dichiara l’esperienza, che è maestra delle arti».
11 «[L]a  consuetudine è  un’altra  natura» (ibid.,  p.  19).  This  is  actually  a  thought  which already
appears already in Thomas Aquinas’ De regno.
12 On Savonarola and the relation Machiavelli-Savonarola, see also M.L.  COLISH,  Republicanism,
Religion, and Machiavelli’s Savonarolan Moment, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 60/4, 1999, p.
597-616; L. Polizzotto, The elect nation. The Savonarolan movement in Florence 1494-1545, Oxford,
Clarendon, 1994;  A.  MCQUEEN,  Politics in Apocalyptic Times. Machiavelli’s Savonarolan Moment,
forthcoming. It  is  worthwile to note that,  just  as with assessments of Machiavelli’s  own religious
beliefs, there is hardly a scholarly consent on his attitude towards Savonarola – was it harshly critical,
was it rather ambigous or was he even in some respects heir to Savonarola’s approach? Typically,
these  texts  emphasize  the  apocalyptic  character  of  Savonarola’s  sermons  more  than  the  present
investigation.  But  while  the  contrast  between  Savonarolas’s  history  as  salvation  history  and
Machiavelli’s history as oscillaction between rule and contingency confirms the present argument (cf.
below, IIIc), I prefer to focus on the ethical (in contrast to: political) character of his approach first.
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But  two  points  remain  somewhat  underexposed:  First,  Savonarola  is  not  entirely  clear  about  the
reasons and motives that the prince pursues – is it immediately pride, lust and greed, and avarice, or is
it that the Prince above all wishes to secure his status13? And second, while he depicts in detail an
impressive repertoire of tricks, he does not explain on account of which forces each trick operates and
proves to be successful and how they converge to one common movement. One important common
denominator of those strategies is obviously the attempt to forestall the establishment of processes and
associations  of  vital  and  well-informed  public  political  deliberation,  another  one  is  the  active
manipulation  of  the  discrepancy  between  appearance  and  reality.  But  these  are  not  subjects  that
Savonarola would recognize and discuss explicitly. By contrast, he dedicates an extra chapter to how
the tyrant stands opposed above all to Christian life: «There is nothing more odious to the tyrant than
the service of Christ and the Christian life, for it is directly his opposite, and one opposite seeks to
dispel  the  other  one»14.  In  fact,  the  third  part  of  the  treatise  explains  how to  design  republican
institutions in Florence and how the Florentine citizens should behave in order to prevent a tyrant from
taking control over the city. Savonarola describes the institution of a Great Council and how it could
be kept operative15. And since, on Savonarola’s initiative, Florence already had such an institution, he
finally describes how the citizens should behave in order to perfect it, and what benefits they can
expect from such behaviour and perfection. The gist of the argument is that, if the citizens follow the
virtues  of  Christian  piety,  of  devotion  to  the  common good,  of  concord,  and  of  justice,  in  good
confidence  that  it  was  God himself  who  has  given  them their  form of  government,  then  God is
assuredly going to lead them to the perfection of their government, to reward them with spiritual and
temporal prosperity, and to expand their rule and empire. Living according to the mentioned virtues
and convictions,  they can and must  rely on God illuminating their  conventions  and councils  and
sending them servants with special advice when it comes to more arcane issues. In other words, trying
to live in piety, concord and justice, the citizens can and should rely on God providing Florence with
good decisions,  with prosperity  and with peace and security.  Some of  the more decisive political
developments and events are beyond intentional human planning anyway, especially with regards to
external security: «And because sometimes someone makes himself a tyrant by force of arms, and you
cannot resist force with reason, we cannot give further instructions for this case» 16. Savonarola thus
emphasizes both human free will and the dependency on divine support and intervention.
As is well-known, when Pope Alexander VI finally and decidedly confronted Savonarola, when he
excommunicated him and used his considerable power to pressure the Florentine government,  the
preacher failed to mobilize the popular support he had gained against this adversary. His outspoken
reliance  on  divine  backing  even  turned  directly  against  him  when,  in  order  to  prompt  a  divine
miraculous "sign", he was tried by ordeal and burned at the stake. It turned out that the people had
supported him not for his or even its own sake, but for the relation he was thought to entertain with a
transcendent  power,  and  when  he  was  unable  to  substantiate  his  claim  of  such  a  relation,  the
disappointment  was  so  much  the  griever  and  turned  against  him.  For  Machiavelli,  Savonarola’s
13 «Primo, perchè ha la superbia, lussuria, e avarizia, che sono le radici de tutti i mali. Secundo,
perchè avendo posto il suo fine nello Stato che tiene, non è chosa che non faccia per mantenerlo» (G.
SAVONAROLA, Trattato del reggimento …, tratt. II, cap. II, (ed.) Silvestri, p. 31).
14 «[N]on è cosa, che più abbia in odio il Tiranno, che il culto di Cristo, ed il ben vivere Cristiano,
perocchè è direttamente suo contrario, ed uno contrario cerca di scacciare l’altro» (Ibid., tratt. II, cap.
III, (ed.) Silvestri, p. 48).
15 This includes its representative set-up, its domain of responsibility and, again rather pragmatically,
measures like the session interval, requirement of publicity of its proceedings and penalties for failing
to show up in its constitution and sessions. At the same time, Savonarola seeks not to determine too
many details and leave room for the Florentine people to learn from experience and know themselves
how to handle these things best. Cf. Ibid., tratt. III, cap. I, (ed.) Silvestri, pp. 53–59.
16 «E perchè qualche volta per forza dell’armi si fa il Tiranno, e alla forza non si può resistere con
ragione,  circa  a  ciò  non possiamo dar  altra  istruzione;  ma intendiamo a  dichiarare,  come si  può
provvedere, che un cittadino, non per forza di armi, ma con astuzia, e con amici non si faccia Tiranno
della città a poco a poco, pigliando il dominio di quella, come si è fatto per i tempi passati » (Ibid.,
tratt. II, cap. I, (ed.) Silvestri, p. 53).
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complex  theoretical  rationale  and its  political  context  was  well-known and of  great  influence.  It
provided him with several points on which to attach his own discourse. Of these, we will discuss in
turn how Machiavelli transformed Savonarola’s idea of reliance on Divine intervention into his own
(dual) concept of  fortuna and  virtù, how he pushed Savonarola’s analysis of stratagems beyond the
discussion of the tyrant’s wickedness, and the role he assigns to historical experience.
III. Niccolò Machiavelli
IIIa) (Reliance on) divine intervention and "virtù"/"fortuna"
For  Machiavelli,  Savonarola  figures  as  a  "prophet"  unable  to  translate  his  merits  and  his  moral
authority to political force. While political power and success is based on popular support, and while
Savonarola is a prime example of a leader grounding his authority on such popular support, it is not
enough to simply  have such support,  not  enough merely to  be liked;  this  needs to be mobilised,
translated,  channelled  into  social  and  political  force,  and  taken  quite  some  way  into  concrete
programmes  and  actions.  Not  assuming  these  tasks  and  rather  choosing  to  depend  on  divine
intervention and on altogether external  circumstances,  Savonarola  could not  but  perish 17.  Actually
Machiavelli does not at all dispute the merits that Savonarola had earned by improving the citizens’
morals,  fighting  against  tyranny  and  corruption,  and  reforming  Florentine  institutions.  Still,
Savonarola’s problem was that he did not manage to provide for a forceful support for himself. As we
have seen, he had even described the very mechanisms that rulers have often used to strengthen their
position of power – only he declined from making any use of them for the sake of his status or for the
sake of the stability of the republican regime he helped to found. Savonarola has apparently failed to
recognize to what extent these mechanisms are related more to the establishment of public authority in
general than to the particular wicked goals and designs of a tyrannical ruler. Consider what he had to
offer to more honest citizens and politicians in place of such mechanisms: In the absence of a reliable
connection  between  intentions,  actions,  and  their  consequences,  a  reliance  on  favourable  divine
intervention, and a virtue ethics that is meant to deserve and invite such intervention.
Commentators have pointed out that Savonarola and Machiavelli seem to agree in their assessment of
the limited purview of human intentional action, with the small difference that the latter replaced God
with  fortuna18. But this overlooks three crucial things: First, that  fortune is far less well-intentioned
than God; to the contrary, the point is rather that, however virtuous a person may be, the success of his
actions depends on blind and fickle contingency. Second, that political  virtù also consists in never
surrendering to contingency, in trying to act while taking the uncontrollability and unpredictability of
politics into account. The virtuous prince eventually succeeds in restraining fortune, which is like a
river, by making provisions, like building dams and levees. And it seems he can even enhance his
chances  by  impetuousness,  i.e.  by  refraining  from  calculating,  but  going  forward  with  resolute
action19.  And third,  Machiavelli  unambiguously  explains  that  fortuna is  not  really  a  transcendent
power or even a subject after all, but an illustrative device meant to clarify the unpredictability of the
contexts  of  political  action and at  the  same time their  recognisable responsiveness  to  determinate
action. What this illustrative device effectively represents is the set of historical circumstances, the
respective constellation of social  and political  powers,  of  armed forces,  of  ideas and convictions.
These determine the options an agent has and the success his actions meet; it is their complexities and
ambiguities, not their transcendence, that withdraws them from the realm of reliable calculation and
intentional planning. The challenge for the political practitioner as well as for the theorist is then to
«understand» the options that lie in this set of circumstances, its proper momentum and its restraints
17 A ruler who newly came into power and does not neglect his duties (understood in a Machiavellian
sense), can earn double glory, according to Machiavelli: «first, for having laid the foundation of a new
rule;  and then because he consolidated and honoured it  by good laws,  a good military,  and good
examples» (MACHIAVELLI, Principe,  cap.  XXIV…). Savonarola  obviously failed in  establishing a
good military, and possibly also in giving good examples (of political art and prudence).
18 Cf. M. FERRARA, Savonarola. Prediche e scritti commentati e collegati da un racconto biografico,
vol. I, Firenze, Olschki, 1952, p. 219, note 117. Ferrara refers to the Principe’s chapter 25, which is
indeed the chief locus for the upcoming argument.
19 Cf. H.F. PITKIN, Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli,
Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984.
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on timing – without being able to clearly and distinctly grasp all  those conditions in their various
possible meanings, in their varying degrees of determination and in their latent mutual dependency.
Virtù is the capacity to see the meaning(s) implicit in the respective constellation and to act so as to
meet them halfway. In order to understand those contexts and the impact that (one’s own) actions can
have,  Machiavelli  shows  according  to  which  logic  they  typically  operate.  He  explains  that  he  is
interested in the  veritá effettuale, in the efficient causes that are susceptible of determining political
developments, and he contrasts these with the ineffective causes presumed by Savonarola and others20.
IIIb) Wicked scheming and the management of appearances
Think of Machiavelli as taking a stand on the question of effective forces in his description of how
ecclesiastical  principalities,  i.e.  how  the  Church  state manages  political  power.  At  first  glance,
Machiavelli  seems to chime in with the Church’s claims which explain a special character of this
commonwealth:  Founded precisely  on  divine  intervention  and providence,  on  spiritual  union  and
sacramental authority, it stands apart from normal, secular commonwealths (in a certain way, it is the
prime example of a Savonarolan commonwealth guided, protected and developed by God himself)21.
Hence, it need not obey the otherwise universal laws and imperatives of politics:
Costoro soli hanno stati, e non li defendano; sudditi, e non li governano: e li stati, per essere indifesi, non
sono loro tolti; e li sudditi, per non essere governati, non se ne curano, né pensano né possono alienarsi da
loro. Solo adunque questi principati sono sicuri e felici.
[These are the only princes that have states without the necessity of defending them, and subjects without
governing them; and their states, though undefended, are not taken from them, whilst their subjects are
indifferent to the fact that they are not governed, and have no thought of the possibility of alienating
themselves from their princes. These ecclesiastical principalities, then, are the only ones that are secure
and happy]22.
However,  as he continues to describe the marvellous development that  the ecclesiastical  state has
taken  with  Alexander  VI,  it  becomes  clear  that,  in  the  eyes  of  Machiavelli,  this  picture  of  a
transcendentally blessed commonwealth must not be trusted. It is simply not the special nature of the
ecclesiastical  commonwealth  that  is  at  the  roots  of  those  developments,  but  an  exceptionally  apt
leader, Pope Alexander VI, Rodrigo Borgia. It was his clever politics – his keeping the Roman grandi,
the Colonna and Orsini, in check, his elimination of Savonarola, his changing of alliances with and
against the French, his strategic appointments of cardinals and the diplomatic and military missions on
which he sent his son, Cesare Borgia – that has produced the immense growth of power of the Church
20 Cf. C. LEFORT, Machiavelli and the veritá effettuale, in: idem, Writing. The Political Test, Durham,
Duke Univ. Press, 2000, p. 109-141.
21 The sketch of this community seems to evoke first of all the Church as the community of believers,
united as the one mystical body of Christ (cf. e.g. Rom 12:5) with Christ as its head. And with regard
to this body, the spiritual authority of the Church was not very controversial in catholic theology. The
most common story suggested that its foundation was on the one hand the giving of the keys to the
heavens to Peter by Christ himself (Mt 16:19), and on the other hand the apostolic succession which
continued and perpetuated the  sanctified character  of  ecclesiastical  government  through episcopal
ordination (e.g. Acts 6:5-7). Now, precisely in Savonarola’s sermons and in the apocalyptic mindset
popular in the Florence of those days, the spiritual destiny and stewardship of Florence was closely
coupled with its temporal development and customs. At least for this reason, if not in a more general
perspective, Machiavelli played on the delicate relation between this mystical body / spiritual authority
and the Church’s temporal authority over the papal states, which was neither meant to be infallible nor
of an uncontroversial genealogy. Cf. e.g. P.  PARTNER, The Lands of St. Peter. The Papal State in the
Middle Ages and the Early Renaissance, Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1972 and P. PRODI, The
Papal Prince: One Body and Two Souls: the Papal Monarchy in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982; cf. also again COLISH, Machiavelli’s Savonarolan Moment.
22 MACHIAVELLI, Principe, cap. XI, (ed.) Martelli, p. ??? [engl. trans. by ??, ??, p. ??]. 
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state. Over the course of Machiavelli’s treatment of these developments, it becomes clear that they can
be analysed in purely secular terms and that such an analysis does not lack in explanatory force at any
point. In the extraordinary chapter on the ecclesiastical principalities, Machiavelli in the end shows
how these states can be analysed just like any other, and how in fact they are states just like any other.
I want  to illustrate the general  direction this analysis takes by a further comparison to traditional
scholastic discourse. While the suggestions in Machiavelli’s Principe are often very original and at any
rate not just inherited from scholastic theories, the issues he touches have frequently been debated in
such  theories  for  a  long time already.  Consider  the  case  of  the  classical  «super-virtue»  justice23.
Machiavelli  mentions justice  among the possible  virtues  of  a prince,  but  he  completely sidesteps
questions of the meaning and content of justice. And while Savonarola had already focussed rather on
the effects and consequences of just behaviour for the commonwealth, Machiavelli analyses it even
more «externally»: He reflects on the consequences of the mere appearance of just behaviour in the
public sphere. And, for justice as for the other virtues, this «external» analysis is almost all there is to
them – Machiavelli seems intent on saying that, as far as politics is concerned, the very truth of those
virtues is to be found in how the respective behaviour appears to the public. Similarly, in all issues the
Principe seems to  adopt  the  perspective  of  the  ruler,  but  usually  includes  reflections  on  how he
appears to his subjects as a person and as an institution. After all, apart from him being and aiming to
remain ruler, there is little question about his motives and interests, his personality and character traits,
his ethical life or even his eventual salvation. For Machiavelli, being a ruler or, more generally, to act
politically  means to  try  and manage appearances  so that  one can calculate  as  far  as  possible  the
perceptions of the citizens and play with their desires. Claude Lefort has expended considerable effort
to describe how Machiavelli all over the place thus analyses a distinct, «imaginary» level of political
phenomena24. Herein lies a more subtle contrast to Savonarola: Whereas the latter emphasizes that the
root of evil lies in a prince’s worry about his reputation, Machiavelli points out that this caring for it
may very well be his principal task. In addition to actual arms and the possible reliance on violence,
the prince must learn how to play on expectations and beliefs, he must be in command of artifice and
trickery, as Machiavelli illustrates with the prominent metaphor of the lion and the fox25. However,
Machiavelli’s characteristic approach goes so far as to ruin the idea of "true" intentions, motives and
convictions that would somehow "lie behind" the appearances. Insofar as these exist at all (and even if
they exist, to a large extent they are certainly already shaped and informed themselves by what is
merely apparent), they have no bearing on what actually happens and how it should be judged. Finally,
it must be said that the ruler cannot be thought of as a subject that would be constituted independently
of  the  desires  and  perceptions  of  his  subjects,  able  to  objectively  assess  them,  to  predict  their
behaviour and to calculate the effects of his own actions with reliable certainty. He must be wary of
falling himself for this image of an instance with a more universal vocation, which he yet has to foster.
In fact, this is one of the occasions where Machiavelli  ponders the motives and aspirations of the
prince: in order to demote them to second rank and to heteronomy – they have to be put into practice
with considerable reflexive moderation and long-term considerations26. At any rate, let us keep in mind
that, while the forces at play elude certain knowledge, they are certainly not transcendent forces in the
sense of either divine or structural norms or interventions.
IIIc) Historical experience
The absence of a concern with the purpose of political society is far more than a coincidental neglect
on Machiavelli’s part that could very well be remedied in a more extensive and complete account27.
His disregard for the question of a subject which possessed the powers to know about and govern the
development of human society is countered by a discussion which puts an emancipated human history
23 Justice is one of the objectives that should organize civic behaviour also according to Savonarola.
Cf.  G. SAVONAROLA,  Trattato del reggimento …, tratt. III, cap. II, (ed.) Silvestri, p. 62sq.  Another
telling topic could be the role of peace in the different discourses.
24 Cf.  C. LEFORT,  Machiavelli in the Making, Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 2012, here esp.
chap. 4.
25 Cf. MACHIAVELLI, Principe, cap. XVIII, (ed.) Martelli, p.???.
26 Cf. Ibid., capp. XVIsq and XXI, pp.???
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in its place28. In history, men shape their societies, provide them with meaning and orientation; and
from history any knowledge of society must be gained, be it for theoretical or for practical purposes.
But at the same time there is no history "as such", as a coherent, substantial and universal entity that
would unfold over time, ensuring that events follow some logic or order, or make sense. There is only
that  which happens and which could,  at  any time,  happen otherwise;  there is  only the respective
history of the particular context at hand (which can hardly be limited and circumscribed precisely,
however). Both in the Principe and in the Discorsi, historical examples illustrate a logic which seems
to govern political dynamics. And yet, at a close reading, the same discussion of historical examples
reveals that it is not really a «logic» that is at work in politics. The laws of political developments are
not really laws at all, and e.g. the same behaviour in similar contexts by different persons might meet
different success. After all, is not one of the points of Machiavelli’s discussion of Cesare Borgia that
for all his political ability, and although he did everything right, yet he could not free himself from the
dependency on external factors and agents? In both major treatises, Machiavelli addresses potential
political actors, even revolutionary leaders (Giuliano or, in the end, Lorenzo de’ Medici in the case of
the Principe, his young republican interlocutors in the Orti Orticellari in the case of the Discorsi) and
teaches them to develop a sensorium for analysing and understanding the diverse dimensions of their
own situation, and the crucial point seems to be to understand this situation as a specific moment in an
open history. It is certainly necessary to understand the present situation thoroughly, including how far
it results from a conjuncture of concrete historical developments (the social conflicts, the revolt of the
Ciompi and its  fate,  the  force of  the  condottieri and of mercenaries,  the  basis of  their  power,  its
conditions and their respective development, the role of the pope and the Church state, of the nobles in
Rome and in Florence, of the French and Spanish kings, Savonarola’s ideas, reforms, and his fate, the
general renaissance fascination with ancient Rome etc., etc.) and how it thus possesses a certain proper
"momentum". But at the same time, these developments are not perfectly univocal and the immediate,
let alone the remote future are anything but determined. At any moment, an agent does not only have a
choice,  but  the consequences of his or her options are not  determined.  Political action consists in
positioning oneself in this field, taking risks, pre-empting without controlling Fortuna, and, not least,
exerting influence of  one’s  own.  A good part  of  one’s  influence needs to  be invested in order  to
position oneself at the head of this socio-historical momentum, or at least, in order to appear as such.
One of the more important strategies for this consists in an active, public (re-)interpretation of history.
Except for speaking of «control», the modern saying is quite right: «Who controls the past controls the
future. Who controls the present controls the past»29. The reconstruction and reinterpretation of the
past, the analysis of the present and the effort of political action are closely intertwined aspects of
political practice. Against this methodological and epistemological backdrop, Machiavelli’s writings
exhibit a practical character in quite another sense than the advice-books and theoretical treatises that
have been so prominent in his days. In fact, he is involved in precisely such a re-interpretation of
history;  very  obviously  in  the  Discorsi,  but  also  in  the  Principe.  His  tongue-in-cheek  uptake  of
mythical political founders and their achievements, his biting sarcasm and his ironic, almost absurd
affirmations of the most simplistic conventional axioms can hardly fail to effectively discredit these
very axioms. In this way, they are working on an inversion of this public discourse perhaps much more
effectively than by confronting and denying those venerable principles directly.
IV. "Late scholastic" political theory
We have seen how Machiavelli’s approach sought to distance itself in characteristic, methodological
and epistemological ways from (what he must surely have perceived as being) Savonarola’s and the
older  scholastic  discourse.  As  a  final  point,  I  want  to  examine  if  these  new methodological  and
27 For the following discussion cf. also A. WAGNER,  Bali, Florenz, Paris: Politische Anthropologie
und die  ‹différence temporelle› bei  Claude Lefort,  in:  (ed.)  idem,  Am leeren Ort  der  Macht.  Das
Staats-  und  Politikverständnis  Claude  Leforts,  Baden-Baden,  Nomos,  2013,  pp.  17–47,  on
Machiavelli, see esp. pp. 25–37.
28 Emancipated from salvation history, that is – a contrast that is most striking when one compares the
Principe to  apocalyptic  texts  like  the  sermons  of  Savonarola.  However,  a  different  assessement,
focusing on the last chapter of the Principe, is offered by MCQUEEN, Politics in Apocalyptic Times.
29 G. ORWELL, 1984, Orlando, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1983, part I, chap. 3, p. 88.
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epistemological  ways  are  peculiar  to  Machiavelli  or  if  there  are  analogous  movements  in  other
contemporary discourses. In particular, I want to test this with regard to Francisco de Vitoria, who
wrote at about the same time, had not only a masterful command of the scholastic tradition but also,
through his studies in Paris, a thorough knowledge of renaissance letters, and who has contributed to
the establishment of a discourse about society, law and politics ("Second Scholasticism") that was for
quite some time even more successful than Machiavelli’s.30 Is this new discourse founded on similar
premises and can its success be explained in terms of the needs of the time? While I cannot go into
detail with regard to this latter question, I am going to delineate a line of argument that in a certain
sense runs altogether parallel to Machiavelli’s.
In  De potestate civili,  written and presented as a lecture in 152831,  taking its cue from Rom 13,1:
«There is no power but of God», Vitoria very much picks up the traditional line of reasoning: He
inquires how and why political power came into the world, whether or not it was given to men by
God, and indeed he focuses much more on the structure and qualities of  a "good order" than on
strategies of handling political power. He argues that only God, i.e. a subject that transcends human
society can account for political authority and legal obligation. Or so it seems. Looking more closely,
we see Vitoria advancing an argument according to which power and commonwealth are constituted
inseparably and in  relation to  one another:  There  is  not  at  first  a  political  community that  could
somehow deliberate whether or not  to install  political  power,  but  political  community comes into
being precisely when a distinction is made between political power and society. The mere existence
and recognition of some factual, "social" power (wealth, influence, strength of arms) is not sufficient
to establish a commonwealth – what is crucial is the essential articulation of power to the collective
action of the community on itself.  Political  power for Vitoria means a capability or power of the
community  itself  over  itself,  not  some  quality  or  capacity  of  individual  agents 32.  Obviously  this
argument is anything but a contractual theory of the foundation of political power, where individual
natural persons would convene and deliberate about their privately formed preferences and then come
to a consensus to constitute political  power.  In fact,  the very moment which the metaphor of the
contract is meant to elucidate, the moment of constitution, the actual emergence of political power,
remains unexplained and mysterious. In this sense, political power "as such" cannot be at the disposal
of the community and its existence again has to be presupposed33 – but the articulation is something
that pertains to concrete socio-historic practice. So, as the argument proceeds, Vitoria explains how
institutions are necessary and how the designation of office-holders works (and in these questions,
everything depends on the consent of the people).  On several occasions, Vitoria quite consciously
elaborates a quasi-fictional discourse that links concrete practices and actions, e.g. legislative acts, to
the presumed process of a self-governing commonwealth,  using "as if"-constructions34 or  fictional
30 On  the  reception  of  Machiavelli  in  spanish  scholastic  and  humanist  discourse,  cf.  H.
PUIGDOMENÈCH, Maquiavelo en España, Madrid, Fundación universitaria española, 1988; J.M. FORTE
and P.L.  ÁLVAREZ (edd.),  Maquiavelo y España. Maquiavelismo y antimaquiavelismo en la cultura
española de los siglos XVI y XVII, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2008; K.D. HOWARD, The reception of
Machiavelli in early modern Spain, Woodbridge, Tamesis, 2014.
31 FRANCISCO DE VITORIA,  On  civil  power,  in:  IDEM,  Political  Writings,  (edd.)  A.  Pagden-J.
Lawrance, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991, pp. 1–44.
32 Cf.  VITORIA.  On civil  power,  cit.,  §  7,  p.  11:  «Therefore  I  conclude that  power  exists  in  the
commonwealth  by  God’s  ordinance.  But  the  material  cause  on  which  this  naturally  and divinely
appointed  power  rests  is  the  commonwealth.  The  commonwealth  takes  upon  itself  the  task  of
governing and administering itself (gubernare/administrare se ipsam) and directing all its powers to
the common good».
33 Of course, instead of «power necessarily has to be presupposed», Vitoria rather says «power has
been given to men by God», but in terms of their discursive function, these two formulations are
equivalent: We cannot know the ultimate foundation of power, and yet we know for sure that it is
there. And even in a theological reading, the authority of power derives primarily from the dignity of a
community governing itself, and only very remotely from God who has made the world and man so
that these communities seem natural.
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historical  accounts35,  both  of  which  mix  public  discourse  with  the  more  technical  arguments  of
juridical  disputes  (praesumptiones  factorum/iurum).  Thus  they  have  consequences  both  in  the
technical logic of juridical discourse and in the imaginary realm of public discourse.
While the (Spanish) scholastics of the 16th and 17th century thus seem not to abandon their teleological
framework36, they clearly make room for social practice in the constitution of normative validity and
political authority, they exhibit some sensitivity to the fact that the processes of this constitution have a
performative-hermeneutical dimension which sets them apart from strictly logical derivations and they
tend to regard this social practice as a historically dynamic and open process37. Also, they are very
original and influential in their concern with practical matters and tend to regard social practice not
just as a field of application of principles developed in theory, but as an epistemic resource itself: As a
meta-ethical approach, their doctrine of probabilism, for example, meant that in order to acknowledge
the legitimacy and rationality of social practice it is necessary to abandon the primacy of determinate,
univocal reasoning and rely on the historical record and on a form of complementary, reconstructive
and uncertain reasoning38.  These findings suggest  that  scholastic discourse on social,  political  and
generally practical matters was undergoing a substantial transformation in terms of its epistemological,
methodological and meta-scientific convictions, too – a transformation that was in important respects
analogous  to  the  transformation  prompted  in  a  more  radical  way  by  Machiavelli.  This  turn  to
immanence and history in the theoretical reflection of social life can then perhaps be taken to be a
crucial step to what we consider as modernity.
V. Conclusion
It is most adequate to think of Machiavelli as charting a field of practice for theoretical description.
The diverse dimensions of this practice, the particular subject-matter of the  social, with its aspects of
scale, inertia, irregularities, path-dependence, and notably its sub-field of  politics with its aspects of
conflict and identification, of law and violence, of hegemony and ideology, are examined in order to
create a sensitivity for the autonomous logic that  this  field possesses.  The  Principe’s  overarching
question «by which means political rule can be achieved and conserved» on the one hand presupposes
the very existence of political power which is not questioned, but at the same time power is presented
as a fragile and precarious thing. The traditional questions of how there can be a legitimate power, of
what its purpose is, are not touched at all, instead one learns how one can get hold of it. And yet, not
alone is this not easy, it is even never fully achieved but an interminable historical undertaking. In the
Principe, the creation of political power, its essence and the relation of the means of achieving and
conserving power to its essence are all treated, but in a way that is fundamentally unlike the traditional
discourses under these headings: Whereas authors like Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Savonarola and even
Machiavelli’s contemporary Francisco de Vitoria started their treatises with the  creation of political
power, in the sense of how and why it came into the world for the first time, Machiavelli discusses
34 «[L]aws passed by a king have the same force as if they were passed by the whole commonwealth,
as explained above. But laws passed by the commonwealth bind everyone – hence they bind the king,
even if he himself passed them» (VITORIA, On civil power, § 21, cit., p. 40), [my emphasis].
35 Cf. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA,  On the American Indians, in: IDEM,  Political Writings, cit., pp. 231–
292, q. 2, art. 1, p. 255.
36 Compare even more explicitly Vitoria’s own defence of his final-cause-approach against a material
theory of science in VITORIA, On civil power, cit., § 2, pp. 4–6.
37 On the corresponding formation of historical accounts of particular societies, cf. A. PAGDEN, The
Fall of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology, Cambridge,
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982.
38 Cf.  R.  SCHÜSSLER,  On  the  Anatomy  of  Probabilism,  in:  (edd.)  J.  Kraye-R.  Saarinen,  Moral
Philosophy on the Threshold of Modernity, Dordrecht, Springer, 2005, pp. 91–113. For a description
e.g. of Luis de Molina’s extensive interviewing of merchants for his work  De iustitia et iure see  S.
SCHWEIGHÖFER, Luis de Molinas Theorie der Gerechtigkeit und ihre Auswirkungen auf das Recht, in:
(edd.)  K.  Bunge  et  al.,  Kontroversen  um  das  Recht/Contending  for  Law,  Stuttgart,  frommann-
holzboog, 2013, pp. 311–339.
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how one can found "new modes and orders" and new states at any time. While the former authors
explain the  essence of power in terms of its  purpose or final  cause, Machiavelli  conveys that  the
essence of power must be understood from its material cause, that is, from the physical and imaginary
substances which political dynamics modulate. And of course this attachment of power’s essence to its
substance instead of  its  purpose  also affects  the  discussion of  adequate  and inadequate  means to
achieve and conserve power.
With this profile, Machiavelli contributes to an extensive and important transformation in the way that
modern  theory  reflects  on  society  and  politics,  hermeneutically  analysing  particular  institutional,
cultural and ideological processes and appreciating both the weight of history and the freedom of
political agency. And we have seen in how far Machiavelli’s contribution is much more radical than
analogous  expositions  by  his  contemporaries.  While  these  may  perhaps  offer  more  convincing
accounts of specific problems and how to eventually solve them, e.g. of possible ways to feed morality
back into theory and practice, it is from Machiavelli that we can learn best what the modern insight
into the nature of the social-historical-political complex is in the first place.
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